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A. No. 22864.

In Bank.

Oct. 28, 1955.]

DOROTHEA COLE et al., Appellants, v. PAUL RUSH
et al., Defendants; PRANK VAN STONE, Respondent.
[1) Intoxicating Liquors- Civil Liability- Torts.-The common
law gives no remedy for injury or death following the mere
sale of liquor to the ordinary man, either on the theory that
it is a direct wrong or on the ground that it is negligence,
which imposes a legal liability on the seller for damages resulting from the intoxication.
[2a, 2b] !d.-Civil I,iability-Torts.---"1\Iere knowledge by a sellPr
of intoxicating liquor of the belligerent disposition of the purchaser when he was intoxicated does not establish the sale of
the liquor as a proximate cause of injuries subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication.
[3] !d.-Civil Liability-Torts.-In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate
cause of injuries subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication.
[4] Courts-District Courts of Appeal-Finality of Judgment.A judgment of a District Court of Appeal, after denial of a
hearing by the Supreme Court, stands as a decision of a court
of last resort in this state until and unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court or until change of the law by legislative action,
although denial of a hearing is not the equivalent of express
approval by the Supreme Court.
[5] Intoxicating Liquors-Civil Liability-Torts.-If a man who
is injured by reason of his intoxicated state may not himself
recover from the one who provided the liquor, his survivors
may not recover in a wrongful death action.
[6] Id.-Civil Liability-Torts.-A cause of action for wrongful
death is not stated by a complaint alleging that decedent
was a frequent patron of defendants' cafe, that he was well
known by defendants to be of quiet demeanor normally and
to be belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome when intoxicated, that prior to the date in question his widow had requested d0fendants not to sell liquor to decedent in sufficient
[1] Right of action at common law for damages to plaintiff in
consequence of sale of intoxicating liquor to another, note, 130
A.L.R. 357. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 3; Am.Jur.,
Intoxicating Liquors, § 607 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6, 10, 11] Intoxicating Liquors,
§ 110; [4] Courts, § 157; [7] Constitutional Law, § 78; [8] Statutes, § 185; [9] Statutes, § 183.
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quantity to allow him to be intoxicated, that because of liquor
sold on such date he became intoxicated, engaged in a fight
with another patron, and struck his head on the pavement
when he fell from a blow, resulting in his immediate death.
[7] Constitutional Law-Distribution of Powers of Government-Judicial Interference.-For the Supreme Court to hold that
plaintiffs stated a cause of action by averring facts which
establish that no cause of action arose either by statute or by
common law as the same existed at the time of the events relied
on would at least constitute a departure from its constitution;:J!
function and an encroachment on that of the Legislature.
[8] Statutes--Presumptions- Legislative Knowledge.-In adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judieial decisions and to have enacted
and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a
direct bearing on them.
[9] !d.-Presumptions-Legislative Intent.-'l'he failure of the
Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the
subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are
made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in
the aspects not amended.
[10] Intoxicating Liquors- Civil Liability- Torts.-Though the
Legislature has made numerous changes in statutes governing the sale, use and furnishing of intoxicating liquors and
in statutes haviug to do with various aspects of tort liability,
it has not adopted a statute inconsistent with the common law
so far as concerns a remedy for injury or death following the
furnishing of liquor to the ordinary man, and under such circumstances the legislative intent appears to be to maintain,
rather than to depart from, the pertinent common law, and the
common law is the controlling law in such case. ( Civ. Code,
§ 22.2.)
[11] !d.-Civil Liability-Torts.-It is established both bv the
common law and the decisional law in this state that a~ to a
competent person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale
or gift, of intoxicating liquor that is the proximate cause of
injury from its use; that the competent person voluntarily
consuming intoxicating liquor contributes directly to any injury caused thereby; and that contributory negligence of the
decedent bars recovery by his heirs or next of kin in a wrongful death action.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment for
defendant on sustaining demurrer to an amended complaint
without leave to amend, affirmed.
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John C. Stevenson and Lionel Richman for Appellants.
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee, J. H. Peckham and
C. G. W. McGee for Respondent.
MacFarlane, Schaefer & Haun, E. J. Caldecott, Trippet,
Yoakum & 'fhomas and Lyle C. Newcomer as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-In this wrongful death action plaintiffs,
-vvho are the surviving widow and minor children of James
Bernard Cole, deceased, seek to recover damages for the
allegedly negligent furnishing of intoxicating liquor to the
deceased, which plaintiffs claim proximately caused his death.
They appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon the
sustaining of a demurrer to their amended complaint, without
leave to amend. We have concluded that the trial court
correctly held that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, and that the judgment should
be affirmed.
The material allegations of the amended complaint are
that defendants own and operate an establishment known as
the Tropic Isl!~ in which "intoxieating liquors are sold and
furnished to the public for consumption on the premises'';
on October 13, 1950, James Bernard Cole was a patron of
the 'rropic Isle and defendants ''did sell, furnish, give, and
cause to be sold, furnished and given'' to him alcoholic
beverages which he drank; immediately before he came "to
the premises of the defendants . . . Cole was not intoxicated
by reason of the use of alcoholic beverages,'' but he ''did
drink said alcoholic beverages so sold, furnished and given
until and after . . [he] became intoxicated.'' Cole had
patronized the Tropic Isle on numerous occasions and was
well known to defendants, who also knew that he was ''normally of quiet demeanor but that when . . intoxicated he
became belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome"; on numerous prior occasions plaintiff widow had requested defendants "not to sell or furnish intoxicating beverages to
said James Bernard Cole sufficient! to allow him to become
intoxicated thereon" (italics added), but defendants refused
1
By what standards or tests the defendants on any occasion might
determine the amount which properly could be furnished is not disclosed.
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to comply with such
;
reason of said intoxication, and by reason of said alcoholic beverages so unlawfully
sold, furnished or
. . . and as a proximate result
thereof, . . . Cole became belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome . . . Cole did thereafter on said date quarrel with
one Pranklin IJeonard . . . Cole and . . . I,eonard did engage in fisticuffs; . . . Cole was struck
. Leonard and
did fall to the pavement, striking his head against the concrete, by reason of which
. Cole suffered a subarachnoid
hemorrhage, traumatic, and died immediately from the effects
of said blow'' ; at the time of his death Cole ''was an ablebodied man of the age of 39 years,'' earning approximately
$4,000 a year.
Defendant Prank Van Stone, alleged to be one of the
owners of the Tropic Isle, demurred to the amended complaint
on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. By way of particularizing its
insufficiency he specifies, among other things. that the complaint shows on its face that decedent's injuries were caused
or contributed to by fault and negligence on decedent's part
and that it cannot be determined in what manner any acts
of the defendant were the proximate cause of the alleged
injuries. Pollowing the hearing upon the demurrer and the
statement of counsel for plaintiffs that ''he cannot further
amend,'' the court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, and judgment was entered accordingly.
[1] The general rule of the common law as to tort liability
arising out of the sale of intoxicating beverages is stated in
30 American Jurisprudence 573, section 607: "The common
law gives no remedy for injury or death following the mere
sale of liquor to the ordinary man, either on the theory that
it is a direct wrong or on the ground that it is negligence,
which imposes a legal liability on the seller for damages
resulting from the intoxication." (For examples of cases following the rule see: Hitson v. Dwyer (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d
803, 808 [143 P.2d 952]; Fleckner v. Dionne (1949), 94
Cal.App.2d 246 l210 P.2d 530] ; Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry.
Co. (1921), 186 Cal. 379, 384 [199 P. 523]; Howlett v. Doglio
(1949), 402 Ill. 311 [83 N.E.2d 708, 712]; Tarwater v.
Atlanta Co., Inc. (1940), 176 Tenn. 510 [144 S.W.2d 746]:
48 C.J.S. 716-718; see also anno. 44 L.R.A.N.S. 299; 130
A.L.R. 357-369.) A number of jurisdictions have adopted
statutes creating a right of action, under specified conditions,
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against persons furnishing intoxicants. 2 California, however,
has enacted no such statute notwithstanding the fact that,
as hereinafter shown, its Legislature has repeatedly dealt
with problems concerning alcoholic beverages and concerning
tort liability.
[2a] Plaintiffs with commendable frankness state in their
opening brief (p.
that they "recognize that it is the general
rule of law that it is the consumption of the intoxicating
liquor which is the proximate cause of any subsequent injury
by reason of such intoxication rather than the sale of intoxicating liquor'' (citing Hitson v. Dwyer (1943), supra,
and Fleckner v. Dionne ( 1949), supra; see also Collier v.
Stamatis (1945), 63 Ariz. 285 [162 P.2d 125, 127]: "The
principle is epitomized in the truism that there may be sales
without intoxication, but no intoxication without drinking"),
but urge that "knowledge on the part of the defendants
of the propensities of Cole to seek a quarrel when intoxicated,
and . . . their v,.ilful refusal to heed the pleas of the wife,
and their wilful insistence in selling intoxicating liquor to
Cole and allowing him to be intoxicated'' are distinguishing
factors which support the charge of negligence here and
establish the sale of the liquor as the proximate cause of the
injury. Such a view, we conclude in the light of the common
law, cannot be sustained in this state in the absence of legislative action.
[3] In the first place, it appears that in Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1921), supra, 186 Cal. 379, 384, this
court stated and relied on the general rule that ''the sale
of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate cause of injuries
subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication.'' In that case the plaintiff, while intoxicated, was
ejected from defendant's passenger train; he left the place
of immediate peril where he was ejected but later returned
to the tracks at a point about three-quarters of a mile away
and was seriously injured. The court said: ''The only connection between the ejection and the injury would be the
fact that if there had been no ejection there would have
'It appears that such a statute has been adopted in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mi~higan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. (See 48 C.J.S. 717-718, ~ 431; 30 Am.
Jur. 576, § 612; Ann. Cas. 1917B, p. 534; Black on Intoxicating Liquors,
§ 277, pp. 326-331; see also 6 A.L.R.2d 798-807.)
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been no injury. The sale of the whiskey to the plaintiff would
come nearer being a
mate cause of the
than
the ejection from the railway train. The peril arising from
the ejection ceased the moment the passenger left thr position
where he could be struck by defendant's trains, while tlw
peril arising from the usc of the intoxicating liquor contimwd
in operation up to the time of the injury and contributed
thereto, and yet it has been uniformly held in the abseneP
of statute to the contrary that the sale of intoxieating liquor
is not the proximate eause of injuries subsequently received
by the purchaser be<~ause of his intoxication (,Joyce on Intoxicating Utquors, § 421; Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231. 234 [20
N.E. 73, 3 L.R.A. 327].) . . . 'l'lwt the injury was not the
proximate result of the ejection is demonstrated by the fact
that the plaintiff was able to, and did in fact, leave the place
of danger and subsequently of his own volition returned to
a position of danger on defendant's tracks, and that but for
plaintiff's action in so returning to a position of danger the
accident \vou!d not have occurred.''
[2b] In the second place, it is to be observed that in
Fleckner v. Dionne (1949), supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 246, knowledge on the part of the tavernkeeper was. as here, expressly
averred. The allegations of the complaint there were that
on the evening in question defendant Dionne, a minor, was
a patron of the tavern and was sold and given intoxicating
liquors and allowed to consume them in the tavern; that
the defendant tavernh:eeper knew that Dionne was a minor
and sold the liquors to him while he was already under the
"severe influence of intoxicating liquors"; that he knew
also that Dionne had upon or ncar the premises an automobile and would thereafter chive it; that defendant knew and
should have known and foreseen that the driving of the
automobile by him in his then intoxicated condition could
and would result in harm and damage to others upon the
hig·hway; that Dionne while so intoxicated negligently drove
his automobile into an automobile in which plaintiffs were
riding and injured them; that the sale and serving of the
liquor to Dionne by defendant constituted a "negligent disregard of the rights of plaintiffs" whicb joined with Dionne's
negligence in proximately injurillg plaintiffs. Defendant's
general demurrer was sustained with leave to amend and on
plaintiffs' failure to amend jlH1g-ment \Vas entered in defendant's fayor. [4] 'l'lw Distriet Conrt of i\ppral affirmed the
judgment1 rely iug Ul)()ll the HiL::svn and Lammer::; ea::;es, supra,

Oct.

CoLE v. Rus:a:

351

[45 C.2d 345; 289 P.2d 450]

as well as upon various u>lt-Gf-state decisions, and this court
denied a hearing. 3 Its judgment stands, therefore, as a
decision of a court of last resort in this state, until and
unless disapproved by this court or until change of the law
by legislative action. It is to be noted that the knowledge
alleged in the Fleckner case was more specific and .extensive
than that in the instant case. Here it is only alleged that
defendant knew of the belligerent disposition of the deceased
when he was intoxicated.
In the next place, it is to be observed that in Hitson v.
Dwyer ( 1943), supra, 61 Cal.App.2d 803, it was held that
one who suffers injuries by reason of his own intoxication
may not recover from the tavernkeeper by reason of the sale
of the liquor to the plaintiff. In that case plaintiff alleged
that while obviously intoxicated and sitting on a movable
stool at defendants' bar he wrongfully was served intoxicating
liquor, and as a result he fell from the stool to the floor,
and was thereafter dragged by defendants from his position
on the floor; that as a result of the fall or the dragging or
both, plaintiff was injured. It was held that so far as concerned the fall and any injuries suffered therefrom, the
proximate cause was the drinking of the liquor rather than
the wrongful (i.e., in violation of the alcoholic beverage
control act) sale thereof to an obviously intoxicated person,
and any wrong in the sale was nonactionable. This court
denied a hearing. [5] If the man who is injured by reason
of his intoxicated state may not himself recover from the
one who provided the liquor, then it follows that under the
established law governing wrongful death actions, his survivors may not recover in this, which is such an action.
(Buckley v. Chadwick (1955), ante, pp. 183, 201 [288 P.2d
12, 289 P.2d 242]; see also Dernge v. Feierstein (1936), 222
Wis. 199 [268 N.W. 210, 212] [liquor sale]; Scott v. Green3
Denial of a hearing is not the equivalent of express approval by
this court but it has been said that "The order of this court denying a
petition for a transfer . . . after . . . decision of the district court
of appeal may be taken as an approval of the conclusion there reached,
but not necessarily of all of the reasoning contained in that opinion."
Eisenberg v. Superior Court (1924), 193 Cal 575, 578 [226 P. 617]; see
also People v. Rowland (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 540, 542 [55 P.2d 1333].)
'l'he significance of a denial in any particular ease is also to be understood as further qualified by the fact that under the Rules on Appeal
a denial may mean no more than that a ground which we deem ade·
quate or im~1rllr11t for rorc1cring a hearing has not been brought to our
attention. (See ruie 2U, Rules on Appeal.)
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ville Pharmacy (1948), 212 S.C. 485 [48 S.E.2d
8261
[barbiturate sale]; 30 Am.Jur. 575, § 610.)
Other cases, from other jurisdictions, relied upon by plaintiffs are clearly distinguishable on their facts, even if it be
assumed that upon similar facts action would lie in California. For example, Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich ( 1950). 88
F.Supp. 900, was an action against saloonkeeper;; by one of
their patrons who, while he was eating in the saloon and
, / cafe, was attacked by another patron, one Hobson, who was
drunk. Although dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action in that it was not alleged that defendants knew Hobson was of a violent disposition or had
threatened harm to plaintiff before he was served the last of
the intoxicating drinks. the court did observe ( p. 903) that
"The present trend is apparently toward holding the defendant saloonkeeper liable for lawless acts occurring in the
saloon," and quoted from 30 American Jurisprudence 574.
section 609, the statement that ''The better reason appears
to favor placing on the proprietor the duty of seeing to it
that the patron is not injured either by those in his employ
or by drunken or vicious men whom he may choose to harbor.
Further, a guest or patron of such a place has a right to
rely on the belief that he is in an orderly house and that its
operator . . . is exercising reasonable care to the end that
the doing·s in the house shall be orderly." Here, if Leonard
had been injured by Cole (who was the attacker) and if the
former or his next of kin were the plaintiffs, and if it were
further alleged that Leonard had been within the defendants'
premises and was there attacked by Cole, we would then have
a ease to which the Cherbonnier decision might bf' pertinent.
Obviously it is not in point on the facts which are alleged.
Rommel v. Schambacher (1887), 120 Pa. 579 rn A. 779.
6 Am.St.Rep. 732]; Curran v. Olso11 (1903). 88 Minn. 207
r92 N.W. 1124, 97 Am.St.Hep. 517. 60 L.RA. 733] ; and
Peck v. Gerber (1936). 154 Ore. 126 [59 P.2d 675. 106 A.hR.
996], additionally relied upon by plaintiffs, also involve the
liability of the saloonkeeper as a proprietor for not using
reasonable care in maintaining order for the safety of his
guests. However, as is indicated in the opinions in the cited
cases as well as in the annotation in 106 American r~aw Reports 1003, following the report of Peck v. Gerber (1936),
supra, and as recognized by the court in the Cherbonnier case,
the liability of a saloon keeper in thi~ line 0f ra~es appe;1rs
to be related to that of iunkeepers aud restaurateurs for
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to guests or patrons by other guests or persons not
connected with the management. and is an exception to the
general common law rule of nonliability of the vendor of
intoxicating liquor, and furnishes no precedent for imposing
liability on the saloonkeeper under the circumstances alleged
in the complaint in this case.
In Pratt v. Daly (1940), 55 Ariz. 535 [104 P.2d 147, 130
A.L.R 341], plaintiff wife was permitted to recover damages
resulting from defendants' sale of intoxicating liquor to her
husband with knowledge of the fact that the husband was
an halntual drunkard. Arizona had no civil damage statute.
The court there, after discussing the rule as stated in Restatement of the Law of Torts. volume 3. section 696. that
''One who, without a physician's direction, sells or otherwise
supplies to a married woman a habit-forming drug with
knowledge that it will be used in a way which will cause harm
to any of the legally protected marital interests of the busband is liable for harm caused by such drug to those interests
unless the husband consents to the wife's acquisition or use of
the drug" and that the same rule applies to a sale to the
husband in an action by the wife under similar circumstances
(see also 130 A.L.R 352-365). then goes on to observe ( p.
347 of 130 A.L.R.) : "Of course, since there is not the same
presumption that the use of liquor will eventually cause the
loss of volition that there is with a habit-forming drug, it is
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that to the knowledge of
defendant such a stage has been reached by the consumer,
but if this fact is once established. in all reason and logic the
right of action should be the same in one case as in the other
. . . [P. 348.) The allegation of the complaint is that the
husband of plaintiff was an 'habitual drunkard,' and that
the fact was well known to defendants. The term 'habitual
drunkard' has been defined repeatedly, and in almost all
of the definitions the principal element emphasized is that
such a person has lost the will power to resist the temptation
when the liquor is offered him." In Collier v. Stamatis
( 1945), sttpra, 162 P .2d 125, 126-127, the Arizona court held
that no cause of action for loss of services lies against a
tavernkeeper who unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor to a
child of the age of 15. upon which she became intoxicated,
because "It cannot be said as a matter of law that a child
of fifteen has neither will nor choice nor discretion whatever"; the court further confirmed that its opinion in the
4S C.2d-12
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Pratt v. Daly case rested upon the showing by plaintiff wife
that her husband was ''incapable of voluntary action.'' (See
also Cavin v. Smith (1949). 228 lVIinn. :)22 [37 N.W.2d 368.
369].) By contrast, the plaintiffs in the case now before us
allege no such lack of volition on the part of the decedent,
but, rather, that he was an "able-bodied man" who was not
intoxicated immediately before he entered defendant's establishment on the day in question. Other cases indicating the
court's awareness of the materiality of the r"lement of volition
or of competency, and, henee, of at least contributing responsibility of the voluntary drinker or user, are Seibel v.
Leach (1939), 233 Wis. 6() [288 N.W. 774], in which the
court remarked that "1Jndt'r the eommon law it is not an
aetionable wrong to sell or to give intoxicating liquors to au
able-bodied man.'' and affirmed a judgment dismissing the
complaint; and Scott v. Ureenmlle Pharmacy (1948. S.C.),
supra, 48 S.E.2d 32±, 327, in which it was pointed out that tlw
complaint failed to cleseribe plailltiff 's deceased husband "as
being without mind or Ia•• king in volition." in buying and
consuming barbiturate capsules during a period of about a
year, at the end of which time he eommitted suicide by hanging himself, and judgment for defendant, who sold the barbiturates, following the sustaining of his demurrer was affirmed. (See also :30 Am.Jur. 575-576. § 611.)
[6, 7] For this court to hold that plaintiffs have here
stated a cause of action by averring faets which establish
that no eanse of aetion arose either by statute or by common
law as the same existed at the time of the events relied upon
would at the least constitute a departure from its constitutional funetion and an encro:whment upon that of the Legislature. As declared by the eonrt in State v. EI atfielcl ( 1951),
197 l\Id. 249 [78 A.2d 754. 757], in affirming the judgment
on demm·rer in defendants' favor in a wrongful death action
in which plaintiff widow whose husband was killed by an
intoxicated driver sought damages from tavern owners who
bad sold the liquor, ''It would be worse than futile for us to
attempt to convince plaintiff by reason, where all other courts
have failed and the accumulated mass of authority carries
no we1ght at alL In the cireumstances of this case . . . we
should virtually usurp legislative power if we should declare
plaintiff's contentions to be the law of Maryland. In the
course of the last hundred years there probably has seldom,
if ever (except during prohibition), been a regnlar session
of the General Assembly at whic~h no ll<Flc>l' law.:. were passed.
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On few subjects are legislators kept better informed of legislation in other states. In the face of the flood of civil damage
laws enacted, amended and repealed in other states and the
Volstead Act--and of the total absence of authority for such
liability, apart from statute-the fact that there is now no
such law in Maryland expresses the legislative intent as
dearly and compellingly as affirmative legislation would.''
(See also Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis (1943), 70 Ga.
App. 879 [28 S.E.2d 329, 338].)
The significance of legislatiYe action in the light of established law and of pertinent judicial decisions has been repeatedly recognized in this state. [8] As we have so re(•ently said in Buckley v. Chadwick ( 1955), supra, ante,
pp. 18il, 200 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242J, "It is a generally
accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature
is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judieial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the
light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them."
[9] The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a
particular respeet when the subject is generally before it
and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an
intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.
In this connection it should be noted that section 22.2 of the
Civil Code of this state specifically declares that ''The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent >Yith the Constitution of the United States, or the
Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in
all the courts of this State." (See also Philpott v. Superior
Court (1984), 1 Cal.2d 512, 515 [86 P.2d 635, 95 A.L.R. 990];
Oin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara ( 1933), 217 Cal. 678,
6D5 [22 P.2d 5]; Munchiando v. Bach (1928), 203 Cal. 457
[264 P. 762]; Peters v. Peters (1909). 156 Cal. 32,84 [103 P.
219, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 699] ; 10 Cal.Jur.2d 651-6i'l2, § 2, and cases
there cited; 23 Cal.Jur. 603.)
[10] Accordingly, it is to be noted that notwithstanding
the hoh1ing of this court in Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.
(J 921), supra, 186 Cal. 379, 384; and of the District Court
of Appeal in Ilitson v. Dwyer (194:3), supra, 61 Cal.App.
2d 803, 808, and in F'leckner v. Dionne (1949), supra, 94
Cal.App.2d 246, the r~egislature of California has at no time
seen fit to adopt a statute incon~istent with the eommon law
so far as concerns a remedy for injury or death following the
furnishing of liquor to the orc1inary man. Demonstrat.ing
awareness by the Legislature of problems relating to the fur-
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nishing and consumption of intoxicating liquors, and a
similar awareness in respect to problems of tort liability,
it is _!)Ointed out (without attempting to go back as far as the
Lammers case, in 1921) that in the 10 years immediately following the decision in the Hitson case (1943) the I,egislature made numerous changes in statutes governing the sale.
use, and furnishing of intoxicating liquors
c.g., Stats.
1945, pp. 1023, 2295, 2615: Stats. 1947, pp. 2003. 2051, 2490.
2791, 2936, 3019, 3025; Stats. 1949. pp. 492, 1546, 1582, 1884.
2060,2349, 273;); Stats. 1931. pp. 1897,2814, 3051; Stats. 1953,
pp. 646, 918, 954, 1949, 2084, 334:3) and also in statutes having
to do with various aspects of tort liability (see e.g., Civ.
Code, §§43, 43.5(a), 45a, 46, 47. 48, 48a, ·18.5, 171(c), 956.
1714.5, 1714.6,3341, 3342; Code Civ. Proc., §377), but there
was no adoption of a statute imposing liability in such a case
as is now before us. Under such circumstances not only does
the legislative intent appear to be to maintain, rather than
to depart from, the pertinent common law, but in the further
light of the express enactment (Civ. Code, § 22.2) that "The
common law . . . so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all
courts of this State,'' it beeomes manifest that the common law
is the controlling law in this case. (Estate of Apple (1885), 66
Cal. 432, 434 [6 P. 7] ["where the code is silent, the common
law governs"]; Estate of Wickes (1900), 128 Cal. 270, 274 [60
P. 867, 49 L.R.A. 138] ["The common law is the rule of decision in this state, where no positive law, state or national,
controls"]; Peters v. Peters (1909), supra, 156 CaL 32, 34
["The common law of England is declared to be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state, so far as it is not repugnant
to or inconsistent with our constitution and statutes"] ; see
also Gray v. Sutherland ( 1954), 124 Cal.App.2d 280, 290
[268 P.2d 754]; 10 Cal.Jur.2d 652, § 2.)
[11] Since it is established both by the common law and
by the decisional law in this state ( 1) that as to a competent
person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift,
of intoxieating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury
from its use; (2) that the competent person voluntarily consuming intoxicating liquor contributes direetly to any injury
caused thereby; and (3) that contributory negligence of the
decedent bars recovery by his heirs or next of kin in a wrongful death aetion, the judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J ., and Traynor, J ,, concurred.
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::;PENCE, J .-1 concur.
Further consideration of this case upon rehearing convinces
me that the governing lavv, as heretofore enunciated by the
court:;; of this state as well as by the courts of practically
all other jurisdictions, precludes plaintiff's recovery. I am
further in agreement with the vie>v expressed in tlw main
opinion that the establishell rules should be followed until
such time as these rules may be changed by legislative action.
I therefore conclude that the trial court properly sustained
the demurrer, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
CAH'rEH, J.-I dissent.
I do not agree with the statement of the majority opmwn
that the common law so clearly forbids recovery in a case
such as the one under consideration, or that under the circumstances here presented the consumption of the liquor,
rather than its sale, should be considered the proximate cause
of the drath. For the reasons stated by me in my dissenting
opinion in th<' case of Buckley v. Chadwick, ante, p. 183 [288
P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242], I also disagree with the holding that
any contributory negligence on the part of a decedent is, or
should be, a bar to rt'covery by his heirs or next of kin. It further appears to me that the holding that plaintiffs' decedent
was a "compt'tent" person because of plaintiffs' use of the
phrase '' ablr bodied'' in describing him is outside any of the
issues here presented. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew
of the decedent's propensities when intoxicated-that ht' was
dangerous to himst'lf and to others-and that they, with
such full knowledge, sold alcoholic beverages to him.
Under the holding of the majority here, a tavern owner
may escape liability for the death or serious injury of innocent
third persons by an intoxicated patron when he has furnished intoxicating liquor to such patron after warning by
both relatives and police that such person should not be
furnished any intoxicating liquor whatsoever because of his
vicious propensities when intoxicatt'd. I cannot subscribe
to such a holding.
It is true that California has no civil damage, or Dramshop
Act. (Pleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d 246, 249 [210 P.2d
530].) The question is, therefore, whether, at common law,
the surviving spouse and children of a decedent had a cause
of action against one who, with notice, sold intoxicating
beverages to a patron, and whether the selling, or the drinking,
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nf the liquor was the proximate eanse of the snbs0quent
injuries.
I am of the opinion that the California cases dealing with
this problem are distinguishable from the case at bar.
In the case of Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.App.2d 803 [143
P.2d 952], plaintiff alleged that while a patron of the bar.
and in an obviously intoxicated condition. he was served
intoxicating liquor as a result of which he fell from the
movable stool on which he was sitting ; that he was dragged
from his position on the floor by the defendants. and as a
result of which, he suffered a fracture and other injuries
of the shoulder and body. He contended that the defendants.
knowing his condition, negligently failed to take precautions
to protect him. Plaintiff relied in part upon the Alcoholic
Beverage Act (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 3796, § 62,
Stats. 1935, p. 1123) which makes it a misdemeanor to sell
alcoholic beverages to an ''obviously intoxicated person.''
'l'he court held that it could not be said that trw purpose of
the act was to protect an obviously intoxicated person, as
the act itself declared ( § 1) that the purpose was to promote
"
in the highest degree the economic, social and moral
well-being and the safety of the State and of all its people."
It was also held that "The principle that a violation of a
statute or ordinance is negligence per se, is subject to the
limitation that the act or omission must proximately cause
or contribute to the injury. (Burtt v. Bank of Cali forma
National Association, 211 Cal. 548 [296 P. 68] ; Lawrence v.
Sonthern Pac. Co., 189 Cal. 434 [208 P H66].) Fnless the
alleged violation of the Beverage Act by defendants constituted the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries such violation is wholly immaterial to a disposition of this appeal."
'l'he court continued to state the ''general rule'' as follows:
"Hather we find the general rule to be as stated in the case
of Elyba v. C . .tL Elornernan, Inc., 302 Ill.App 143 [23 N.E.2d
564 J : 'The common law gave no remedy for the sale of liquor
either on the tlwory that it was a direct wrong or on the
ground that it was negligence, which would impose a legal
liability on the seller for damages resulting from intoxieation.' '' and that the rule found support in the ease of
Lammers v. Pacific Elcc. Ry. Co., 186 CaL 379 [199 P. 523],
wherein the court held that the sale of intoxicating liquor
is not the proximate cause of injuries subsequently received
by the purchaser beeaww of his intoxication. "'l'herefore, in
the absence of a showing to the contrary, the proximate cause
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is not the wrongful sale of the liquor but the drinking of the
liquor so purchased."
The case of F'leckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d 246 [210
P.2d 530], was an action brought, in part, against the owner~
of a tavern. [t was allrged that these defendants had sold
intoxicating liquors to one Dionne, a minor. knowing that
he was alrt>ady intoxicated and lmmYing that he would drive
his car in an intoxicatrcl condition which could, and would.
result in harm to otbers using the highway; that Dionnr.
in an intoxieat(•d condition. dicl drive his car so negligently
and recklessly tl1at be caused it to eollide with the car in
which plaintiffs wrre riding to their injury and damage:
that all of said injury and damage was the direct and proximate result of the "unlawfnlness, negligenee. recklessness of
the defendants" in selling the intoxicating liquor to the
obviously intoxicated minor, Dionne.
Tlw court cited both the Lamnwrs and Hitsou ease:s and
held that in both of them the language in re proximate cause
was not neces:sary to the decision since in the Lammers casr
the statement "it has been uniformly held in the absence
of stattde to the contrary that the sale of intoxicating liquor
is not the proximate eanse of injuries subsequently received
by the purchaser beeanse of his intoxication'' was qualified
by the words ''in the absence of statute to the contrary'' and
in the Hitson case the actionable wrong was the dragging
of plaimifl' across the floor. (Emphasis added.)
'fhe court cited Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66 [288 N.W. 774]
where the adion was for proprrty damage and personal
injuries bronght by a third person against the defendant
tavern owner for selling intoxicants to one Leach who drove
his car in such a manner as to cause plaintiff's injuries and
damage. fn the \Visconsin (:asc. the court relied upon Dernge
v. F'eier·stein, 222 Wis. 199 1268 N.W 210] which was an
action brought by a widow whose hnsbancl had been sold
intoxicants by tavern owners after she had given them notice
not to let her bn~baud haw any more liquor. After leaving
the taYcrn, her husband lost control of his car and was
fatally injured. 'l'he court there held that there was no cause
of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in favor
of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee (Black,
Law of Intoxicating Liquors, ch. 13, § 281; Buntin v. Hutton,
206 Ill.App. 194; Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463 (161 A. 151];
Coy v. Cntting. 138 Kan. 109 [23 P.2r1 458] ; State v. Johnson,
23 S.D. 293 Ll21 N.W. 785, 22 hR.A.N.S. 1007] ; Kraus
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v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809 l182 N.W. 364, 365] ). The
California court concluded that in the absence of civil damage
legislation in this state, and with such views as have been
expressed by our courts on the subject (Lammers and Hitson
cases) coinciding with the holdings in other jurisdictions
where the questions have been passed upon, ''we are satisfied
that the sustaining of the demurrer of respondent Pangracs
was correct. ''
Mr. ,Justice Dooling dissented. He admitted frankly that
cases from some other jurisdictions were to the effect that
in the absence of statute no remedy existed against the dispenser of liquor for injuries resulting to third persons from
the acts of intoxicated persons. "However. consider0d as
questions of the law of negligence and proximate cause, I
cannot bow to the r·easoning of those decisions when carried
to the fnll extreme of holding that under no circumstances
can one who dispenses liquor to another knowing that he is
becoming intoxicated be liable to a third person later injured
by the intoxieated person's conduct; and I can see no reason
for perpetuating in the law of this statE' the error of the
courts of other jurisdictions
"Negligence is mE'asured by what a person of ordinary
prudence would or would not do under the same or similar
circumstances and it is thoroughly settled that negligence
may be the proximate cause of an in}1try to another even
though the act of a third per·son intervenes, 1f a person of
ordinary prudence could reasonably anticipate the probability
of the third per-son's intervemng eoncltwt. ( JJeEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 285, 299 et sE'q. [195 P.2d 783] ;
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 218 et seq. [157
P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; Katz v. Helbing, 215 CaL 448
[10 P.2d 1001].)" (Emphasis added.)
Both the Fleckner and Hitson eases allegE'd no more than
negligence in serving liquors; in the present case, plaintiff
wife alleges that "on oecasions too numerous to name [she]
requested defendants and each of them not to give, sell or
furnish intoxicating beverages to James Bernard Cole sufficient to allow him to become intoxicated'' but that defendants
refused to desist from selling Cole intoxicating beverages;
and that defendants had spec1fie knowledge that when Cole
became intoxicated he was invariably belligerent and quarrelsome. In the Hitson case, the plaintiff was suing for his
own injuries reeeived whilE' he was intoxieated; in the Fleclmer
case, a third person was suing for injuries reeeived by reason
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of the
of an automobile
an intoxicated person.
In neither case were the surviving spouse and dependent
children suing for loss of consortium and support; aud in
neither ease did the defendant tavern owner have prior
specific notice and knowledge of the effect of liquor on the
patron to whom the intoxicants \Yere sold.
In ·woollen and Thornton "I1aw of Intoxicating Liquors"
(vol. II, § 1029, p. 1837) it is said: "The right of persons
injuriously affected by the sale of intoxicating liquors to
recover damages is not entirely restricted to the n:ght given
them by statute. In several jurisdictions it has been held
that when, by the continued sale of intoxicating liquors, a
person has been unable to perform the duties owing by him
to another, under the common law, the seller was liable in
damages to persons to whom the duty was owing for any
loss that he thereby sustained (Holleman v Harward, 119
N.C. 150 [25 S.E. 972, 56 Am.St.Rep. 672, 34 L.R.A. 803] :
''It is lawful to sell laudanum as a medicine. It is also
lawful to sell spirituous liquors as a beverage upon the
dealers complying with the license laws, except in the cases
prohibited by statute. Certainly no fair inference can be
drawn from this that damages may not be recovered from
one who knowingly and willfully sells or gives laudanum or
intoxicating liquors to a wife. in such quantities as to be
attended by such consequences to the wife as are set out in
the complaint in this action.") However. it may be stated
as a general rule, that unless the rights of persons having
pecnliar interests in the buyers of intoxicating liquors such
as a wife in her httsband, or parent in the child, are invaded
by the sales of intoxicating liqtwrs and the seller of such
liquors has notice of the in.furious effects of the liquors so
sold upon the buyer (Holleman v. Harward, supra; Hoard
v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N.Y.) 201 [opium!; Struble v. Nodwift,
11 Ind. 64), the right to recover damages for injuries resulting from the sales of intoxicating liquors is purely statutory, and the action is governed entirely by the provisions
of the statute." (Emphasis added. l
In Peck v. Gerber (1936). 154 Ore. 126 [59 P.2d 675. 106
A.L.R. 996], in which it appears that the plaintiff was assaulted in the saloon by another customer. the latter being
a regular customer who was known to the saloonkeeper to
be a trouble-maker. the court held the saloonkeeper liable,
because he was negligent. and expressed the view that he
did not use the care required of the ordinarily prudent man
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in maintaining order for the safety of his guc>sts. The court
stated that the standard of care (loes not vary, but that the
ordinarily prudent man c'xereiscs care comnwnsnrate with the
dang·ers to be avoided and the likelihood of danger to othrrs.
Tlwre is. appar(~ntly, no statute in Oregon on which recovery
rould havP been prediratcd. Other ra;;;ps in whi(·h thr saloonkeeper was held liablr nnder somewhat similar f'ireumstances
are Mastacl v Swedish Brethren. il:1 Minn. 40 [85 N.W. 913.
R5 Am.St.I{ep. 446. 53 L.R.A. i\081 and Molloy v Coletti,
114 Misc. 177 [186 N.Y.S. 730[ In Curran v Olson, 88 Minn.
:307 [92 N.W. 1124. !)7 Am.St.Rep 517. 60 L.R.A. 7:33],
where the factual situation was different. the court said:
"
. the bartender knew. or mig·ht have known by the
exerrise of the slightt'st care, what th0 alcohol was to be used
for. and could havr prevented thE' injury to the plaintiff."
[n Cher·bonnwr v. Rafalovich (Alaska). 88 F'.Supp. 900,
the court granted leave to plaintiff to plead over to allege,
if he could. that tht' saloonk<>epPr had knowledge of the
patron's violent disposition whilt' under the infinence of
intoxieating beverages Here. thP eourt pointed out (p. 903)
that: "The prest'nt trt'nd is apparrntly toward holding the
defendant saloonkeeper liable for lawless acts occurring in
tht' saloon. It is said in 30 Am .•Jur. 574 that: 'The better
reason appears to favor placing on the proprietor the duty
of seeing to it that the patron is not injured eithrr by those
in thr employ or by drunken or viciom. men whom he may
choose to harbor. Further, a guest or patron of such a place
has a right to rely on the bf'lief that he is in an orderly
honse and that tht' operator. personally or by his delegated
representative, is exercising reasonable cart' to the end that
the doings of the house shall be orderly' "
[ t wonld seem from the foregoing that the rule of the common law with t·espect to intoxicating beverages is not quite
.~o clearly defined in favor of nonliability as would appear
from stat<>nwnts found in other cases, and textbooks, as well
as in tht' majority opinion.
Plaintiffs next contend that the rule of the common law
with respect to habit forming drugs should be controlling
here. At common law. it was held that a wife could bring
an action against ont' who sold habit forming drugs to a
husband with lmowledgt' that the drug was intended to
satisfy a craving induced by habitua I use ( F1 oard v. Peck.
56 Barb rN.Y.) 202: Hnllrrnan \' Harwanl. 119 N.C. 150
[25 S.E. 972, 56 Am.St.RE>p. 672, 34 L.R.A. 803]; Flander-
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rneyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327 [98 N.E. 102, Ann.Cas.
1913A 983, 40 L.R.A.N.S. 360] [morphine] ; Moberg v. Scott,
38 S.D. 422 [161 N.W 998, L.R.A. 1917D 7321 [opium]; Tidd
v Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422 [122 N.E. 447, 3 A.L.R. 1145]
[morphine])
In Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. i535 [104 P.2d 147, 130 A.L.R.
il4 l J ( i1• Arizona there is no civil damage act) it was held
that (!efendant vendor of intoxicating liquors was liable to
the plaintiff wife after selling sueh liquors over her protest
and with knowledge that the plaintiff's llnsband was an
habitual drunkard and had reached sueh a state that his
power to drink or not as he chose had been destroyed. The
eourt concluded that the defendants had breached a duty
owing to the plaintiff for which the plaintiff should be compensated in damages.
A note in Southern California [,aw Heview ( 14 :91) points
out that at common law. a vendor was liable to one spouse
for a sale to the other spouse, or to a parent for a sale to
a minor child of habit-forming drugs to the extent of the
damages suffered by the loss of eonsortium or the services
of the vietim of the drugs, if the vendor knew or had reason
to know that the drugs were to be used for a purpose
harmful to the purehaser. The doctrine stems from the husband's common law cause of aetion against one who injures
the husband's wife and thereby causes the husband expense
and loss of consortium (21 A.hR. 1517' and from the wife's
similar cause of action ( 5 A.L.R. 1049: 59 A.L.R. 680)
recognized subsequent to her right to sue in her own name
as created by the various Married Women's Acts (see Cal.
Code Civ. Proc., ~ 370). Thr doctrine would now seem to
have acquired the dignity of a status distinct from its parPnt
action (Rest. Torts, §§ 696. 6fl7. 705; 17 Am .•Jur .. Drugs &
Druggists, 864, ~ 34), especially in view of its application
to parent and ehild.
'rhe author of the artiele points out that there should be
no reason to distinguish between habit-forming drugs and
intoxicating liquors since both have two important ebaraeteristics in common: ( 1) Their use in substantial quantities
causes injury to the mind and body: and (2) after reaehing
a certain point in their use, a person can no longer control
his appetite for them. (As to the general pharmaeologieal
problem, see The Action of Alcohol on Man [ 1923]. Ernest
H. Starling: The Opium l 'l'oLlem I 1028]. Charles E. Terry
and Mildred Pellens; U. ::3. Txea:mry De1ntrtment, Bureau of
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Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs
[1938].)
In the Pratt case, supra, the court said: ''A careful study
of the cases following the principle laid dowu in Hoard v.
Peck, supra, will show that the
upon which they
were based is that there are certain substances which, if
used habitually,
the volition of the user to such an
extent that he has no power to
but consume them vvhen
they are placed before him; that the consumption and the
sale of such substances are, therefore, merged and become
the act of the vendor; the sale is, therefore, the proximate
cause of the loss of consortium, and the consumer cannot,
having lost his volition to act, be guilty of contributory
negligence. The best known of these substances is opium and
its various derivatives, but it is a well-known scientific fact
that many other things, under certain circumstances, will
produce the same result. Cocaine is an instance among the
drugs, and it is equally well established that the excessive
use of intoxicating liquor may, and frequently does, have
the same effect. We think it would be a narrow and illogical
limitation of the rule to hold that because one habit-forming
substance is a 'drug' in the technical sense of the term, and
another is a 'liquor,' different rules should be applied to the
sale and use thereof. In fact, there is no specific holding applying such limitation in any of the recorded cases,
and in Holleman v. Harward, supra, the court intimated
strongly that under certain circumstances intoxicating liquor
might fall within the same rule as laudanum as a habitforming substance. Of course, since there is not the same
presumption that the use of liquor will eventually cause the
loss of volition that there is with a habit-forming drug, it
is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that to the knowledge
of defendant such a stage has been reached by the consumer,
but if this fact is once established, in all reason and logic
the right of action should be the same in one case as in the
other. \V e are satisfied from our examination of the cases
that the language of the Restatement, S1tpra (Torts, vol. 3,
p. 696) 'c. The expression "habit-forming drugs" as used
in this section does not include intoxicating liquor,' was
not meant as a declaration that the decided cases exclude
liquors from the rule, for no such cases have been cited to us,
but rather is merely a recognition of the fact that the precise
issue had not yet been presented to and determined by any
court.'' The court frankly admitted that: ''Every requested
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of the common law to a new set
of circumstances is originally without precedent, and some
court must be the first one to make the proper application.
"In answer to the second contention (judicial legislation),
we are not asked to make a law. \Ve are asked to declare
what the common law is and
has been, and a declaraus that it has always
such an action, even
none has ever actually been brought, is no more legislation than would be a declaration that it does not.
''So far as the bringing of unwarranted actions is conif the facts do not show the action is justified, we
must assume that the trial court and jury will properly apply
the law, and we may not refuse to declare it correctly merely
because there are some who may attempt to apply it to
cases where the facts do not sustain it.
''On a careful review of all the authorities and a consideration of well-known scientific facts, we think that under
the rationale of the rule laid down in Hoard v. Peck, supra,
and the cases following it, the sale of intoxicating liquors
under the circumstances indicated above is subject to the
same rule as the sale of what is, in the strict sense of the
word, a habit-forming 'drug,' and that under such circumstances an action for the sale of th0 former should be upheld
as allowed by the common law as well as the latter."
In Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161 [290 N.W. 482, 483],
there was no dramshop act involved. The court there was
concerned with facts substantially the same as the ones here
under consideration. Plaintiff's husband was alleged to have
died after drinking liquor sold to him by defendants who
admitted receiving both oral and written notice from plaintiff to refrain from doing so. Defendants appealed from an
order overruling their demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The
court, in afiirming, said: "We are not impressed with the
argument presented in which the appellant has attempted
to differentiate between the opium drug in the case of Moberg
v. Scott, St{pra [161 N.W. 998], and the intoxicating liquor
in the instant case. This court through its former decisions,
which we have just referred to, has quite conclusively established that a complaint such as we are considering states a
cause of action. The right of the wife to the consortium of
the husband is one of her personal rights and we believe that
the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in both statements, as to facts and form, to permit a trial upon the
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merits.
The court also held that the wife had a cause of
action ''independent of any specific statute.''
So far as the rationale of the decided cases is concernedthat the consumption and not the sale of the liquor is the
proximate cause of the injury received by the third personit appears clear that under the circumstances of this case,
the sale and consumption were so merged as to become one
act and under the rule that individuals must be held to have
contemplated the natural and probable result of their own
acts purposely and intentionally committed it is unrealistic
to say that the act of the deceased in drinking the liquor
and thereafter becoming belligerent and pugilistic was not
a foreseeable consequence of the sale by defendant. (See
23 So.Cal.hRev. 420, 421.) This court has held many times
that negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury
even though the act of a third person intervenes, if a person
of ordinary prudence could reasonably anticipate the probability of the third person's intervening conduct (Richardson
v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269] ; Anstin v. Riverside
Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225 [282 P.2d 69]; McEvoy
v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 295, 299 [195 P.2d 783] ;
Mosley v. Arden Parrns Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 218 [157 P.2d
372, 158 A.L.R. 872]; Katz v. Helbing, 215 Cal. 449 [10 P.2d
1001], and others) .
It appears to me that under the facts alleged by plaintiffs it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sustain the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.

